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Abstract
Aim To evaluate if application of failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) to laparoscopy training can help
surgeons acquire laparoscopy skills.
Methods After preparing a FMEA matrix of laparoscopic sigmoidectomy, we have introduced it during three
laparoscopy courses. Forty-eight surgeons, divided into 24 teams of two surgeons, have participated in three courses.
During each course, every team has performed three laparoscopic sigmoidectomies in three experimental animals (1
OR session every day). Risk priority number (RPN) has been calculated for every surgery, and the results have been
discussed at the end of each training day with all participants.
Results We have observed a decline in the median RPN from 1339 during the first OR session through 62 during
second OR session to reach 0 in the third OR session. Only two teams out of 24 were not able to reach a RPN of less
than 300 during third OR session. When the type of failures were analysed, we have observed a shift from procedure-
type failures to technical failures that depended on each participant technical abilities.
Conclusion Application of FMEA principles to laparoscopy training can help acquire non-technical skills necessary
for safe laparoscopic surgery.
Introduction
Advanced laparoscopy training is a process that includes
theoretical basis and practical skills teaching [1]. Several
studies have confirmed that simulation training in
laparoscopy yields better results than non-simulation
training [2]. It seems that abilities learned during simula-
tion training are transferable to the operative room [3].
However, it is still the matter of debate what kind of
simulation training yields better results [4]. Simulators may
be the best way to start for a beginner laparoscopist, while
for advanced students the use of animal models should
probably be the last step before performing laparoscopy
procedures on human patients. Up to 86 % of surgical
residents see animal model as the best way to acquire
laparoscopy skills [5].
Animal model is widely used as a platform for technical
skills perfectioning. However, it can also be used for the
evaluation of the ability of students to perform a safe
operation. Among many tools used for the assessment of
complex procedures, the failure mode and effect analysis
(FMEA) is one of the most commonly used in the industry
F. Alba Mesa  V. Gomez Cabeza de Vaca
Consorcio Sanitario Publico del Aljarafe, Hospital San Juan de
Dios, Bormujos, Sevilla, Spain
M. A. Sanchez Hurtado  F. M. Sanchez Margallo
Department of Laparoscopic Surgery, Minimally Invasive
Surgery Centre Jesu´s Uso´n, Ca´ceres, Ca´ceres, Spain
A. L. Komorowski (&)
Department of Surgical Oncology, Maria Skłodowska-Curie
Memorial Cancer Centre and Institute of Oncology,
ul.Garncarska 11, 31-115 Krako´w, Poland
e-mail: alkomorowski@wp.pl
123
World J Surg (2015) 39:536–542
DOI 10.1007/s00268-014-2827-1
outside healthcare. FMEA is a method used already from
the 60ties in the aerospace industry and later introduced in
automobile industry. It uses a standardized approach to
assess a complex process in order to identify the elements
that carry a highest risk of harm and thus prioritise the
measures used to protect from these risks [6].
The originality of the FMEA consists on prospective
approach, i.e., it identifies possible errors before they
occur. This approach enables each of the elements of a
process to be attributed a cumulative numerical value (risk
priority number—RPN) which is then used to prioritise the
actions taken against this particular element. The numerical
value rates the severity, probability and detectability of
each failure mode. The potential of risk of each element of
the process is calculated with the interpretation of three
indexes that consider the severity of the event (SE: assesses
the implications of the failure), probability of occurrence
(PO: assesses the probability of the failure to appear in
each step) and probability of detection (PD: assesses in
each step the probability of detecting a failure). These
indexes give rise to the RPN. This number is a value
between 1 and 1000, with 1 being the minimum impact on
the process and 1000 the maximum negative impact. It is
calculated using the following formula: RPN = SE *
PO * PD [7].
Traditional tools used for the evaluation of technical
errors and events during laparoscopy training such as the
objective structured assessment of technical skill (OSATS)
are aimed at quantitative and qualitative evaluation of
several tasks [8]. These methods try to measure objective
surgical skills in the moment of action. FMEA on the other
hand establishes an interpretation of potential failures and
their future impact on the patient. Because of that, those
two groups of methods (FMEA versus quantitative and
qualitative methods such as OSATS) may not be compa-
rable due to their metrics and aims. Although both focus on
the improvement of surgical training, they should not be
included in the same surgical skills assessment tools group
because the former aims at non-technical evaluation and
the latter aims at technical aspects of a process.
In particular, the FMEA as the evaluation tool has a
prospective character and consists of the following:
– identification and evaluation of failure modes of a
product or failure mode of a process and its
consequences
– identification of actions that can eliminate the possi-
bility of occurence of previously identified failure
modes.
– documentation of the results
Although the FMEA is applied mainly in the phase of
development of a process or a product, it is also valid to
any complex situation. In this study, we have tried to apply
the FMEA philosophy to laparoscopy training course using
pigs as a model for laparoscopic sigmoidectomy.
Methods
FMEA matrix for the laparoscopic sigmoidectomy
We have applied FMEA methodology to laparoscopic
sigmoidectomy training using pigs as an experimental
model. Before starting the laparoscopic courses, we have
designed a matrix for the process (Table 1) in which all
phases of the process entitled ‘‘laparoscopic sigmoidec-
tomy’’ have been defined. For each phase of the process,
we have analysed the possibility of a preventable failure.
For every failure, we have analysed possible consequences.
The elements considered in the FMEA matrix as potential
causes of failure were established in advance by an inter-
disciplinary working group participating in each step of the
operation (surgeons, anaesthetist and nursing staff). Each
element of the process (each surgical step) has been
assigned a numerical value reflecting its severity (SE),
probability (PO) and detectability (PD). The numerical
value assigned to a particular element of the process was a
result of the discussion between the members of the team.
The whole team involved in creating the matrix for the
process has been previously trained and educated in the
FMEA method.
A RPN was calculated for each failure based on severity
of event (SE), probability of occurence (PO) and proba-
bility of detection (PD) according to the following formula:
RPN = SE * PO * PD. The final RPN value for each
event was between 1 and 1000. We have decided to set a
limit for acceptance of a procedure if the sum of RPNs for
all elements of the process was below 300. This limit was
based on the data from application of FMEA methodology
in industries other than healthcare. An industrial process,
which reaches more than 300 RPN is considered unsafe,
has to be stopped and should be restructurised or elimi-
nated. Since the application of FMEA method in surgery is
a relatively new concept, we could not find evidence from
non-industrial setting for establishing a different RPN limit
value.
After preparing the matrix for the process, we have
designed a laparoscopy training in swine model pro-
gramme based on FMEA methodology.
Laparoscopic sigmoidectomy in a pig model
Four ports are placed for the laparoscopic sigmoidectomy
in a swine model: (1) umbilical for the optics, (2) and (3) in
the right flank for the surgeon’s hands and (4) in the left
flank for the assistant. Surgical steps were as follows:
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opening of a mesenteric window and dissection of caudal
mesenteric artery; identification of the left ureter; clipping
of caudal mesenteric artery; mesorectal dissection and
stapling of distal colon; cranial isolation of proximal seg-
ment of the colon; extracorporeal cutting of the specimen
and placement of the anvil of a circular stapler; restoration
of the pneumoperitoneum; end to end anastomosis; and
checking for possible leakage.
The laparoscopy training course
The training course was designed to last for three days. All
participants were divided into teams of two surgeons. For
each day of the course, every team disposed of one
experimental animal. During the first meeting before
entering the OR, the surgical anatomy of a pig and its
differences from humans were exposed. Afterwards, the
FMEA methodology was explained. Subsequently, the
teams were invited to OR and were asked to perform lap-
aroscopic sigmoidectomy maintaining oncology principles.
During this first session, the students were not tutorized,
i.e., they performed the sigmoidectomy according to their
previous experience and technical skills. The tutors were
present in the OR, but their role was limited only to record
all failures and any technical help or instructions were
prohibited. Once the first OR session was terminated, all
failures committed by all teams were discussed and the
calculation of RPN for each failure of each team was
explained. If a calculated RPN for a team was higher than
300 points, it was interpreted that the procedure could not
be performed in a human patient (a process with a RPN of
more than 300 points is considered too dangerous to be
preformed and should be eliminated). This phase of the
course was dedicated to evidence evitable failures and
create a Hawthorne effect (i.e., improvement in response to
the fact of being studied) [9].
During the second session in the OR, the students
received help from the tutors to eliminate the evitable
failures as discussed during the meeting after the first OR
session. After finishing the second OR session, the evitable
failures of all teams were discussed in a similar manner.
During the third and last sessions in the OR, the students
received help from the tutors as during the second session.
After the third session, the RPN results of each team during
the whole course were discussed.
Follow-up
After completion of each course, a telephone follow-up was
carried out for each participant. During the telephone inter-
view performed 3 months after completion of the course, we
have asked about the degree of implementation of the FMEA
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respective hospitals. We have specifically asked whether
FMEA and laparoscopic approach have been implemented on
regular basis or only in an anecdotal manner.
Results
The three-day laparoscopic sigmoidectomy training course
has been organized three times between 2010 and 2012
with 48 surgeons from Spain, Portugal and Poland partic-
ipating. We have analysed the evolution of the RPN result
of each team and each consecutive experimental animal (in
three OR sessions, there were three experimental animals
operated on by each team). The objective of the course was
to teach each participant the ability to perform a laparo-
scopic sigmoidectomy in a non-supervised environment
with a RPN result of less than 300 points.
To ensure the uniformity of the attendants at the course
during application stage, previous level in laparoscopic
colorectal surgery and experience in open colorectal sur-
gery have been taken into account. Also, the future trainees
were questioned about the possibility of implementing the
laparoscopic technique in their respective hospitals. As a
result, all attendees had between 6 and 10 years of expe-
rience in colon surgery, with 3–5 cases of open colorectal
surgery per month or 1–2 cases of laparoscopic colorectal
surgery per month. Further stratification of the participants
based on their skills was not possible because of the limited
group size.
As we can see in Fig. 1, only three surgical teams out of
24 were able to obtain a RPN of less than 1000 points
during the first session in the OR. However, the RPN result
of each team had a tendency to decrease during the training
course from a median RPN of 1339 ± 457 (first experi-
mental animal) through 62 ± 381 (second experimental
animal) to finally reach a median of 0 ± 130 (third
experimental animal). Already during second OR session,
only 5 teams received a RPN of more than 300 points.
Interestingly, between the first and the second OR sessions,
the students did not receive any technical training. As
stated in the Methods section, during the discussion after
the first OR session, we have only pointed out at which
phases of the process the teams committed mistakes and
how much those mistakes costed them in terms of RPN
score. Also, the meaning of the final RPN result was clearly
defined as acceptable or non-acceptable level of the risk for
the patient. So, the decline in the RPN result during the
second session was as the matter of fact only a result of the
discussion about the failure mode and its implications for
the patient. This effect was even stronger during the third
OR session when only two teams were not able to receive a
RPN score of less than 300 points.
In Fig. 2, we can observe the details of all types of
failures committed by the trainees during all three OR
sessions. We can observe a shift from the failures of pro-
ceeding type to the errors of technical type, the latter being
the result of each participant laparoscopy skills prior to the
course.
When analysing the type of most common errors com-
mitted by the teams during the first OR session, we have
found that there were five phases of the process in which
more than 50 % of the students committed mistakes. Those
phases were as follows:
– positioning of the patient and fixation to the operating
table (error: wrong position and bad fixation).
– positioning of the intestinal loops in order to gain
operative field (error: not suitable surgical field).
– localisation of the ureter (error: lack of undoubtful
localisation of the ureter).
Fig. 1 RPN results for each group for three consecutive operations
for each OR session: a OR session 1, b OR session 2, c OR session
3. RPN—risk priority number
Fig. 2 Percentage of surgeons committing failures during each
phase for each OR session: a OR session 1, b OR session 2, c OR
session 3. Surgical phase: 1 Fixation of patient to the operation
table, 2 Trocar placement, 3 Obtaining surgical field, 4 Splenic
flexure mobilisation, 5 Arterial pedicle dissection, 6 Ureter local-
ization, 7a Proximal specimen division, 7b Distal specimen
division, 8 Division of mesocolon, 9 Abdominal wall incision for
specimen extraction, 10 Stapled anastomosis
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– transection of the intestine (error: bad trocar position-
ing that leads to the use of too many stapler loads which
favours anastomotic leaks).
– abdominal wall section for specimen extraction (error:
laparotomy without previous exsufflation of the pneu-
moperitoneum which can result in ‘‘cancer spray’’ and
cancer implants within the laparotomy scar).
All those errors fall into the class of proceeding-type
errors. These type of errors typically do not depend on the
technical skills of the person performing a task. The root of
the proceeding-type errors is a protocol of action according
to which a person is performing a task. Therefore, once
those errors are identified they are relatively easy to
eliminate; a new protocol should be implemented, and the
team should know how important it is to stick to it.
During the second OR session, the errors were of tech-
nical type:
– bad trocar positioning.
– technical errors during splenic flexure mobilisation.
The last session in the OR was almost error-free. Only
the mobilisation of the splenic flexure remained a difficult
task that lead 17 % of surgeons to perform failures at this
stage of the operation. As this part of laparoscopic sig-
moidectomy is probably the most technically demanding,
we have observed a relatively small decline in the per-
centage of surgeons failing to complete this step from 42 %
during the first OR session. In contrast, all previously
mentioned phases (proceeding-type errors) that posed
important problems to more than half of the participants at
the beginning of the course were completed in a correct
manner by almost all surgeons at the end of the course.
During telephone follow-up performed 3 months after
the completion of the course, all participants confirmed
implementation of the FMEA methodology to laparoscopic
sigmoidectomy in their respective hospitals. Laparoscopy
has been used as a standard approach to all elective sig-
moid colon resections except for patients with contraindi-
cation for the technique (as stated in the telephone
interview).
Discussion
The FMEA model has been tested in various clinical sit-
uations in healthcare. It was successfully applied to the
management of blood transfusion risk [10], preventing
errors in the radiology department [11] and management of
drug prescription in the paediatric ward [12]. On the other
hand, the efficacy of FMEA has been criticised in the lit-
erature for low accuracy [13]. Although its use is recom-
mended by the United States Joint Commission as one of
the proactive risk assessment procedures to be used in
health care organizations [7], there exist only scarce reports
on FMEA application in surgery [14]. We could not find in
the literature any publication about the implementation of
the FMEA principle to a laparoscopy surgery training.
The wide acceptance of laparoscopy techniques in sur-
gery leads to the need of a training programme that would
prepare surgical trainees in a best possible way to perform
laparoscopy procedures. The results of several type of
training programmes that use simulators, experimental
animals or human cadaveric models are encouraging [3].
On the other hand, the technical skills learned during those
programmes are relatively quickly lost by participants if
they do not continue to use the newly learned skills after
the course [2]. Also, we still do not know what kind of
learning environment is ideal for the best absorbent of the
laparoscopy skills [2–4]. It is also not clear whether lapa-
roscopy training should be done individually or with a tutor
[15].
In our study, the failure modes during laparoscopic
sigmoidectomy with highest RPNs (i.e., with the most
serious danger for a patient) during the first evaluation
came from five mistakes relatively easy to avoid: bad
positioning with bad fixation of the patient, bad surgical
field, no ureter localisation, too many stapler loads used for
intestinal transection and incision for specimen extraction
without previous exsufflation. As observed in our study, a
simple analysis of these failure modes resulted in an
important decrease in the RPN results. The difference
observed between the first and the second OR sessions in
our study can be therefore attributed almost entirely to the
Hawthorne effect [9]. Contrary to FMEA methodology, in
case of quantitative and qualitative assessment tools (e.g.
OSATS) which are more frequently used to evaluate pro-
gress in surgical laparoscopy training, the focus is
set almost entirely on correcting technical errors of the
trainees. Therefore, since our methodology was not con-
centrating on technical aspects of the process (laparoscopic
sigmoidectomy), the technical errors remained present
throughout the course.
Colon laparoscopy requires important changes in patient
position during surgery to obtain good exposure. Bad fix-
ation of the patient to the operating table can result in
falling of the anaesthetised patient from the table which is
an extremely serious event. It turned out that it is sufficient
to stress how disastrous consequences can have bad patient
fixation to practically eliminate this failure mode from the
subsequent OR sessions. The same was true for other
protocol-related failure modes like obtaining surgical field,
localization of the ureter and abdominal wall incision for
specimen extraction.
Technical skills-related failure modes are more time
consuming to eradicate, as they require a lot of training for
World J Surg (2015) 39:536–542 541
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the students to master and maintain these skills. However,
as we have shown in our study, a simple discussion about
the failure modes can result in a sharp decrease in pro-
ceeding-type errors and lead to an acceptable RPN result.
This in turn allows the trainees to perform the trained
operation relatively safe on a human patient even if their
technical skills are not perfect. This finding is quite
important since the learning curve in colon laparoscopy can
take as long as 87–152 operations [16].
Our findings also underline the need for regular team
meetings before surgery during which the failure modes of
each surgery should be explained to all team members [17].
It is quite clear that the successful implementation of the
FMEA is dependant on the aptitude of the team members to
hold regular meetings [10].
Currently, there is no prospective risk assessment
method that provides an absolute safety to high-risk health
care procedures. The systematic application of the FMEA
in non-surgical settings can give positive results already
one year after its implementation [18]. It is our opinion that
the implementation of this system in a systematic manner
to the laparoscopic surgery training can contribute to
reduce the risk of human error and thus improve patient
safety.
Proactive risk assessment methods can be successfully
used to address safety in surgical ward by considering risk
associated with all activities of a surgical ward [19]. As we
have shown in this paper, the same proactive approach can
be introduced to surgical laparoscopy course.
Conclusion
The FMEA can be successfully implemented to laparos-
copy training and can help eradicate non-technical surgical
errors.
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